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The Case for Reviving the Four-Year Deal*
Ray Yasser t
Even the most avidsportsfan may well not reahre thatthe modem athletic scholarshpis
no longer a "four-yeardeal." A quiet evolution has occuredand the traditionalfour-yeardeal
has been consigned to the dust bin in the athletic director's office. The modern athletic
scholarship is now a one-year deal, renewable at the sole discretion of the univeisity The
hypothesis of thisEssay is thata viable antitrustcause ofaction exists on behalfofa scholarship
recipient whose scholarshipis not rnewed either becausehe or she has disappointedthe coach
or is no longerable to play due to an injury The antitrwttheory posits that NCAA member
schools have agreed to imit athletic scholarships to one-year renewable awards and that this
agmement isan unreasonablerestramtoftradem violation ofsection 1 ofthe Sheiman Act. The
gist of the claim is that a highly recruitedathlete would have been able to negotiatefor a two-,
the-, or four-year deal had the market not been artificially constrained by the illegal
agreement Abundant case law supportsthe viabilityof this theory This Essay fully examnles
the theory which, ifsuccessfui, would fundamentallyalter the way businessis conductedin bigtime intercollegiateathletics.
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*
[Editor's Note: On October 15, 2011, Professor Yasser submitted this Essay for
publication as part of the Tulane Law Review's Symposium Issue. On October 27, 2011, the
NCAA Board of Directors approved a plan to allow for multiyear scholarships, rather than
requiring all scholarships to be "one-year renewable contracts." The initiative, which was
pushed by NCAA President Mark Emmert, has been met with resistance. On December 27,
2011, more than seventy-five universities expressed their desire to override the multiyear
scholarship plan. As of this Essay's publication date, President Emmert's plan has not been
approved, meaning athletic scholarships are still "one-year renewable contracts."]
D 2012 Ray Yasser. Ray Yasser is the lead coauthor of Sports Law: Cases and
t
Materials, a sports law casebook widely used in law schools around the country, and has
published widely in the area of sports law. Yasser has served as plaintiffs' counsel in more
than seventy Title IX cases, and he has also represented numerous athletes in eligibility
disputes. He teaches torts, sports law, and antitrust law at the University of Tulsa, where he
has won numerous teaching awards. Most recently, his scholarly focus has been on the
possibility of using the courts to reform the NCAA, and he has been actively involved in the
effort to reform the BCS to establish a bona fide national playoff in Division I-A football.
Professor Yasser wants to express appreciation for the superb contributions of his
research assistant, Josh Mozell. Josh exhaustively researched and then pieced together the
largely untold (and unknown) story of how the once commonplace "four-year deal" came to
be replaced by athletic scholarships that by rule can only be one year in duration. He also
provided yeoman's service in preparing the manuscript and getting those pesky footnotes into
shape.
Professor Yasser would also like to thank his long-time faculty assistant and all-purpose
enabler Cyndee Jones for all of her kind assistance during the production of this Essay.
The University of Tulsa generously supported this project with a research grant.
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INTRODUCTION

The four-year deal is dead.' It was quietly killed by the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which now mandates that the
only permissible athletic scholarship is a one-year deal renewable
scholarship at the sole discretion of the school.2 The legal premise of
this Essay is that the mandate for a one-year deal violates section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The policy position taken is that a successful attack
upon the "one-year renewable" will be beneficial to the overall health
of big time intercollegiate sports.
Part II of the Essay tells the story of how the once customary
four-year deal was killed and replaced by the mandatory one-year
renewable. Part III lays out the not-so-hypothetical facts of a potential
plaintiff-a student-athlete "run off" either because he or she suffered
a performance-reducing injury or just simply did not "pan out" as the
coaches had hoped.' In this Part, the student-athlete's section 1 claim
1.
While I have no empirical research to back this up, my anecdotal observation is
that even avid sports fans do not know that the four-year deal has been replaced by the oneyear renewable. The NCAA's killing of the four-year deal was something of a quiet
execution; the story is told in Part II, herein.
2.
The one-year deal is somewhat analogous to the notoriously oppressive but once
commonplace option clause in professional baseball. Under the terms of the traditional
option clause, which was part of the standard one-year contract used throughout the industry,
if the "club" and the "player" could not agree on terms for the subsequent year, the club could
exercise its "option" to renew the contract for an additional year, under the same terms and
conditions of the previous year (in some incantations, the option year contract reduced the
salary). And for years, until ultimately overturned by a famous arbitration decision, Major
League Baseball contended that the option clause itself was renewed, thus tying a player to a
club in perpetuity at the club's option (this rather bizarre interpretation constituted the socalled "reserve system"). The demise of this regime is another story. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 291 (1972). Note that the reserve clause was ultimately undone by the
Messersmith/McNally arbitration decision affirmed in Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v
MLBPlayersAss'n, 532 F.2d 615, 631 (8th Cir. 1976).
3.
The hypothetical plaintiff that I chose to present is based on the plaintiff in
Agnew v NCAA, a case that was filed as a class action in October of2010. Complaint, No.
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is examined, and a result favorable to the plaintiff is anticipated. Part
IV explores the likely consequences of such a finding, concluding that
a successful attack on the four-year deal will have positive effects on
intercollegiate sports.
II.

THE DEATH OF THE FOUR-YEAR DEAL

On Saturday, January 13, 1973, NCAA president Earl Ramer
stepped to the podium at the Sixty-Seventh Annual NCAA Convention
held in Chicago, Illinois.' The first amendment of the day had been
handled and he was ready to move to the next. "We move now to
consideration of Proposal No. 39, a Constitutional revision proposal
concerning the one-year awards."' The stated intent is "[t]o limit
financial aid awards to a period of one year."' After Ramer spoke, a
short discussion followed. A vote was taken by a show of hands and
the amendment was approved.! From start to finish the proposal and
vote took less than ninety seconds.! The banal brevity of the process
did not jibe with the significance of the proposal. The customary
"four-year deal" was unceremoniously buried, replaced by a one-year
renewable, radically altering the landscape of intercollegiate sports to
this very day.

3: 10-cv-04804-JSW (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 25, 2010). The hypothetical plaintiff's biography is
presented in Part III as a prelude to the discussion of his case.
4.

NCAA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 67TH ANNUAL CONVENTION 122 (1973) [hereinafter

67TH ANNUAL CONVENTION].
5.
Id at 123. Proposal 39 amended article 3, section 4-(b). The amendment was
proposed and approved as follows:
(b) Where a student's athletic ability is taken into consideration in any degree in
awarding him unearned financial aid, such aid shall not be awarded for a period in
excess of one academic year, and such aid combined with that received from the
following and similar sources may not exceed commonly accepted educational
expenses as defined in Section 1-(f) of this article.
Id.at A-20.
6.
Id.at A-20.
7.
Id.at 123.
8.
WALTER BYERS wiTH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT:
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 164 (1995). Walter Byers served as the NCAA's first
executive director from 1931 to 1987. He is widely considered the man who brought college
athletics into the mainstream. He signed over fifty television contracts with major networks
as the NCAA's basketball tournament became "March Madness." See Unsportsmanlike
Conduct, U. MICH. PRESS, http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=14486 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2012). His book provides an insider's view of the NCAA and in many parts
provides a scathing report about the NCAA's operation. For the purposes of this Essay,
Byers's book opened the NCAA's doors and provided unique insight into the operation of the
organization.
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The saga of the one-year scholarship starts where major college
sports began: college football in the late nineteenth century.' By the
1890s, football had made its way into the heart of the American sports
fan and was second only to Major League Baseball in popularity. The
Thanksgiving Day Game, usually pitting Princeton against Yale, was
drawing 40,000 people per contest with gate proceeds exceeding
$25,000 (over $600,000 in 2010 dollars).'o Within a matter of years,
stadiums with capacity in excess of 50,000 seats were popping up
across the country." Harvard spent $300,000 in 1903 to build the
nation's first noteworthy stadium.12 Yale constructed a stadium with
75,000 seats, followed by the University of California at Berkeley with
a stadium that holds 76,000." There was money to be made, and
schools did not want to miss out on the potential windfall. 4 So, it was
not at all surprising that colleges recruited and subsidized players, who
may or may not have been interested in being students too."
College football was fiercely competitive in the early days,
rugged, violent, and deadly. With brutal formations that encouraged
9.

BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 8, at 38.

10.

ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN

BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 7 (1999).

For a calculation of relative dollar value, see

PurchasingPower ofMoney in the United States from 1774 to Present,MEASURINGWORTH,
http://www.measuringworth.com/ppowerus/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). Based upon a
consumer price index calculation, $25,000 in 1890 had a purchasing power of approximately
$618,000 in 2010.
11.

MICHAEL ORIARD, BOWLED OVER:

BIG-TIME COLLEGE FOOTBALL FROM THE

SIXTIES TO THE BCS ERA 128 (2009). Oriard's book was relied on in great measure to tell the
scholarship's transition story. The author is well-situated to tell the story. Oriard was a
football player at Notre Dame, and he also played professionally. He is now a professor at
Oregon State University and a respected sports historian. With his distinctive perspective, his
book chronicles the events precipitating the change and explains how the politicization of the
game as well as the racial atmosphere led to the NCAA's reducing the scholarship to a oneyear renewable. This history is compelling, and the story is told meticulously. Without his
book, the truth about the connections of race and NCAA policy might have been lost.
Oriard's account was instrumental in understanding why and how the four-year scholarship
was replaced by the one-year renewable.
12.

ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE

EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEUR MYTH 31 (1998).

Allen Sack is a

professor at the University of New Haven and a long-time sports activist. He is also a former
Notre Dame football player who later played professionally. He focuses on professionalism's
percolation into collegiate athletics. He has authored two books on the NCAA and
professionalism, both of which are cited in this Essay. His books provided rich background
information and helped to piece together the often convoluted story of how the four-year deal
morphed into the one-year renewable.
13. Id.
14. Id. Sack and Staurowsky comment that major college sports not only produced
substantial revenue but also spurred investments in sports infrastructure.
15.
See id at 32.
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high-impact collisions and common practices like gang tackling, the
1905 football season alone saw 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries." In
the preceding fifteen years, 312 football players had been killed." In
1905, in the midst of the public's outrage over the game's violence,
Theodore Roosevelt's son broke his nose while playing in a freshman
football game at Harvard; the President intervened." He called the
college athletic leaders from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to the White
House and urged them to reduce the brutality in the game." The result
was the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (IAAUS), the precursor to the modem NCAA.20 The
new organization's goal was to implement rules to protect the
By
participants from the dangers of play and exploitation. 2
eliminating dangerous facets of the game like the flying wedge,
hurdling, clipping, and spearing, the organization sought to reduce the
number of serious injuries.2

As a result of Roosevelt's influence, his strong belief in the
importance of amateurism became a fundamental principle for the
organization." Roosevelt called it a perversion to make athletics an
end in life instead of a means and said, "[I]t is a very poor business
indeed for a college man to learn nothing but sport."24 A basic
principle was adopted by the NCAA: "No student shall represent a
college or university in any intercollegiate game or contest . .. who has

at any time received, either directly or indirectly, money, or any other
consideration."25 And the first president of the NCAA said, "This
organization wages no war against the professional athlete, but it does

16.
See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supm note 8, at 38. The 1904 season was even more
deadly. Twenty-one players were killed and over two hundred were injured. See SACK &
STAUROWSKY, supm note 12, at 32.
17.
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 10, at 8. From 1890 to 1905, 330 players were killed
playing college football.
18. PAUL R. LAWRENCE, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL 8 (1987).
19.
See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supm note 8, at 38-39; see also History, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the
+ncaa+history (last updated Nov. 8, 2010).
20. History,supm note 19. IAAUS took the present name, NCAA, in 1910.
21.
Id.
22.
KEITH DUNNAVANT, THE FIFTY-YEAR SEDUCTION:
How TELEVISION
MANIPULATED COLLEGE FOOTBALL, FROM THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN NCAA TO THE
CREATION OF THE BCS 18 (2004).
23.
See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supranote 8, at 40.
24. Id.at 39.
25.
Id at 40.
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object to such a one posing and playing as an amateur."26 Amateurism
was built solidly into the foundation of the NCAA.27
As college football continued to grow in the early twentieth
century behind stars like Red Grange and iconic coaches like Knute
Rockne, it became increasingly apparent that the ideal of amateurism
would be stressed.28 Successful teams created a revenue base, strong
ties to their communities, willing investors, and media coverage.2 9
Pressure to succeed increased as colleges and universities came to
believe that academic prominence could be achieved on the coattails of
a winning football team."o To compete and win, colleges openly
subsidized college athletes using alumni, boosters, and college
officials." In the first few decades of the twentieth century, it was
common practice for a booster or alumnus to take an athlete, build a
relationship, and help the athlete pay his way through school.32 Underthe-table compensation took the form of loans that had no expectation
of repayment, cash, sham jobs that required little or no work, and
preferential treatment when competing for jobs." Additionally, many
universities, mainly in the South, instituted outright "athletic
scholarships."34 After three years of researching the subsidization and
recruitment of college athletes, the Carnegie Foundation published a

26.

Id.

See ALLEN L. SACK, COUNTERFEIT AMATEURS: AN ATHLETE'S JOURNEY THROUGH
27.
THE SixTIEs Io THE AGE OF ACADEMIC CAPIrALISM 68 (2008).

28. SeeORIARD, supranote 11, at 129.
29. See SACK, supranote 27,.at 68.
30. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supm note 12, at 31. Sack and Staurowsky describe
Notre Dame in 1913 as an unknown Midwestern college. Yet with a victory in that year over
Army, Notre Dame was thrust into the national spotlight. Sack and Staurowsky continue that
Notre Dame's victories over Harvard and Yale were victories for millions of ethnic working
people over their bosses. Id. at 151 n. 1. The University is now the second most valuable
football program in the nation and has the country's nineteenth highest ranked undergraduate
program. See also National UniversityRanings,USNEWS, http://colleges.usnews.rankings
andreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/page+2 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012);
In Pictures: College FootballkMost Valuable Teams, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/emdm45el/2-university-of-notre-dame-fighting-irish/#gallery
content.
31.
SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 12, at 36-37. Part of the difficulty in enforcing
the principles of amateurism at this point was in the fact that college officials, including
college presidents, were part of the system of compensation and cover-up.
32.
See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supranote 8, at 65.

33.
See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 12, at 36-37; see also LAWRENCE, supra
note 18, at 33. Some of the benefits to athletes included inflated wages or sham jobs like
monitoring how the stadium's grass was growing.
SACK & STAUROWSKY, supm note 12, at 41.
34.
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landmark report in 1929.3' Although the NCAA staunchly opposed
subsidization (whether it be under the table or in the form of athletic
scholarship), the Carnegie report found that subsidization was taking
place at 81 of the 112 schools studied.36
In the mid-i 940s, the so-called Ivy Group schools (Yale, Harvard,
and Princeton) attempted to back away from commercialized sports."
The schools emphasized their opposition to athletic scholarships and
eliminated burgeoning components common to college athletics like
spring practice and the endorsement of commercial products by
members of the athletic department." The Ivy Group sought to have
athletes represent the student body as a whole and aimed to pull
college athletics back into the "essential educational mission of the
universities."" The Big Ten joined the Ivy Group in this attempt to
return college athletics to the place Teddy Roosevelt envisioned.'
For years a battle waged between the Southern schools, which
sanctioned athletic scholarships, and the Northern schools, which
opposed compensation for athletes."' The South's practice of wideopen financial aid raised the talent level.4 2 Better teams yielded
financial returns. For this reason, if the NCAA wanted to travel the
path back to true amateurism, the Southern conferences were not to
follow.43
The NCAA's attempt to straddle the line was named the Sanity
Code." While gesturing to the North, the NCAA strode South in
35. See id at 36. The report, conducted by visiting 130 schools and spending up to
six days at each, took three years to complete.
36. Id.
37. Id at 42, 49. The Ivy Group became the Ivy League Conference in 1956.
38. Id. at 42. This change in the Ivy Group's stance created a wider gulf than there
ever had been. The Ivy Group now stood as close to honest amateurism as any had been
since before the turn of the century. The Southern conferences, however, came close to
embracing professionalism.
39. See id.
40. Id
41.
Id at 41.
42. Id.at 43.
43.
See id at 45. At the 1949 NCAA National Convention, three Southern
conferences engaged in the "Southern Revolt." These conferences had been offering
scholarships since the 1930s and were not going to stop. The Southern, Southeastern, and
Southwestern conferences met not only to discuss ways to loosen the Sanity Code's
restrictions, but also possible secession from the NCAA.
44. ZIMBAUST, supra note 10, at 10. The rule's odd name is derived because it was
allegedly the mechanism by which the NCAA would remove those who violated the rules and
would return sanity to college sports. Some economists maintain the Sanity Code marks the
beginning of the era when the NCAA began to operate like an effective cartel. The colleges
joined hands to set rules to limit the price they pay for student-athletes. In this way, they
conspired to reduce cost and increase profit.
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redefining amateurism.45 The Sanity Code authorized financial aid
based on athletic prowess so schools could recruit and pay tuition for
athletes.46 To insulate itself from claims of "pay-for-play," the Code
required that the aid be tied to financial need, and the amount of aid
could not exceed tuition and expenses.47 Further, recipients were
required to meet the schools' regular entrance requirements and could
not be deprived of the aid because of nonparticipation.4 8 In creating
the Code, neither the North nor the South was fully satisfied. The Ivy
Group wanted pure amateurism and the NCAA moved further from it
than ever before.49 The Southern schools wanted unrestrained financial
aid practices, but the Code constrained them."o
The South continued the fight against limitation on financial aid
and in 1950, seven schools, nicknamed the "Seven Sinners," admitted
abuses of the Sanity Code." The schools were identified as flagrant
violators of the rules, and NCAA leadership asked for expulsion." To
expel, a two-thirds majority was required. With a vote of 111-93, the
expulsion failed." The attempted show of strength by the NCAA had
weakened its legitimacy and authority.54 Power over financial aid and
recruiting returned to the conferences." In 1951, the Sanity Code was
dropped from the NCAA Constitution, and the previous restraints on
financial aid vanished along with it." Laissez-faire returned, and each
school was free to offer aid as it saw fit." The Southern schools had
their victory."
45.
See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supm note 12, at 44.
46.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 8, at 67. The Code also allowed
for some academically qualified athletes to receive aid exceeding the tuition and fees.
49.
See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supranote 12, at 42.
50. SeeBYERS wiTH HAMMER, supm note 8, at 53-54.
51.
See LAWRENCE, supra note 18, at 44; see also BYERS WITH HAMMER, supm note 8,
at 54. The "Seven Sinners" include these schools: University of Maryland, The Citadel,
Virginia Military Institute (VMI), Virginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI), Villanova, University
of Virginia, and Boston College. Maryland was charged with providing excessive aid to
football players. Boston College, Virginia, and Villanova were giving extra financial aid to
student-athletes as well. The Citadel, VMI, and VPI were giving athletes room and board in
addition to what the Sanity Code allowed: tuition and incidental fees.
52. DUNNAVANT, supra note 22, at 19.
53.
BYERS WITH HAMMER, supa note 8, at 54.
54. See DUNNAvANT, supranote 22, at 18.
55. Id at 19.
56. BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 8, at 68; SACK, supra note 27, at 46-47.
57. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supm note 12, at 47. At this point, each school had total
freedom to determine how it wanted to administer aid. The only restriction was that the aid
had to come from the school itself
58. Id.at 46.
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However, within just a few years, a new threat on the horizon
galvanized the schools under the NCAA." Some courts and state
industrial commissions were proposing identifying athletes as
employees.' Such a classification would allow players to claim
workers' compensation benefits. " This happened when injured
football players filed workers' compensation claims.62 Courts that
considered these cases came to opposite conclusions, but the threat
was real." In 1956, as a vehicle to clean up sports and establish "true
amateurism" the NCAA created the four-year athletic scholarship.' It
paid room, board, tuition, fees, books, and $15 a month for nine
months.6 ' The NCAA recognized this was payment, but called it
amateurism by reasoning that "if a player received only expenses, even
though it was more than other students received, he was not being paid
to perform."
To further this idea, the NCAA embarked on a comprehensive
public relations campaign to display its commitment to amateurism to
the courts and the general public." The term "student-athlete" was
created and replaced the words "player" and "athlete" in all the rules
and interpretations." The word "club," commonly used in professional
basketball or football, was replaced by "college teams."" Walter
Byers, executive director of the NCAA at the time, admitted that the
campaign had nothing to do with the noble ideal of amateurism, but
rather was about the practical consequences of litigation involving
worker's rights."o The full-ride athletic scholarship was a marriage of
59. See ORIARD, supm note 11, at 130.
60. BYERS wiTH HAMMER, supm note 8, at 69. See generally Ray Yasser, Are
Scholaiship Athletes at Big-Tine ProgramsReally University Employees?-You Bet They
Are!, 9 BLACK L.J. 65 (1984) (chronicling the workers' compensation cases).
SACK, supra note 27, at 69.
61.
62. See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 8, at 70-71. The first claim was filed in
1953 by a University of Denver player named Nemeth who was injured during practice.
Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc). The second suit was filed
by a widow of Ray Dennison. Dennison was killed as the result of a head injury suffered
while playing football at Fort Lewis A&M. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 314
P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (en banc).
63. See BYERS WITH HAMMER, supra note 8, at 69. Byers felt the threat so real that he
called the idea of athletes being described as employees "the dreaded notion." He recounts
the issue of workers' compensation for players being agonized over behind closed doors.
64. Id at 72.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. SACK, supra note 27, at 70.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. ORIARD, supranote 11, at 130.
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convenience for the NCAA-it made the whole arrangement "legal."
It also set the stage for the dismemberment of the four-year deal.72
As the NCAA continued to commit to its version of
"amateurism," it simultaneously thwarted economic competition by
controlling production costs." Recruiting practices were curbed.74
Payment to the "student-athletes" was limited to tuition, fees, room
and board, books, and $15 a month in "laundry money."" The NCAA's
scholarship practices amounted to cost-cutting behavior." Throughout
the 1960s, the NCAA continued to reduce the costs associated with
scholarships. In 1961, the membership passed the Five-Year Rule,
which limited the practice of redshirting by cutting off a player's
eligibility at five years." After a 1962 study showed that some schools
were paying fees in addition to the standard scholarship, the NCAA
banned that practice.79 The NCAA imposed limits on when and how a
school could transport an athlete in an attempt to reduce costs." And
fearful that an athlete might be overpaid, the NCAA created a rule
limiting how a player could be compensated for officiating a game."
Each of these rules was designed to restrain competition among
member schools and to cut the costs associated with putting on athletic
contests."
The demise of the four-year scholarship began at the NCAA
convention of 1965, and it, too, was driven at least partially by a desire
to cut costs." Earl Sneed, the University of Oklahoma's representative
at the convention, expressed frustration with players who quit athletics

7 1. Id
72. Id.
73. LAWRENCE, supranote 18, at 56.
74. See id. at 57-59. To limit what was done behind closed doors, and therefore
reduce the temptation to engage in prohibited conduct, the NCAA restricted recruiting visits
to two days and two nights, prohibited excessive entertainment and transportation of family,
and mandated that only the school could administer the recruiting funds.
75. Id.at 60.
76. Id
77. Id.at 111-12.
78. Id. Prior to this rule, a school could redshirt a player; this would allow the player
to practice but not play in games to preserve eligibility. This created an older and more
experienced team and a more expensive athletic program.
79. See id. at 112. The study found schools were paying for admission fees, dorm
deposits, summer school tuition-and if the athlete was enrolled in ROTC-uniform fees.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 111.
83.
See id at 113-14. Lawrence recounts severe budget pressures mounting from
ever-expanding sports programs.
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but kept their scholarships.84 He came to the NCAA convention floor
and proposed a one-year scholarship, which was already the practice in
the Big Eight Conference." Questions of abuse by coaches were
raised on the convention floor: Would coaches use the one year as a
trial period for athletes, disposing of those who did not make the
grade?" Sneed assured his fellow delegates that this rule would not be
abused." Coaches were teachers after all, and if a player gave an
honest effort, a coach would not take his scholarship."
This claim by Sneed was either naive or disingenuous. It had
long been the case that coaches would dispose of "deadwood" through
brutal practice schedules." Charlie Bradshaw, the coach at Kentucky
when Sports llustatedprofiled him in 1962, ran off fifty-three of his
eighty-eight players between spring practice and the first game in
September." Bradshaw was not alone. It was by no means a new
problem: Bear Bryant had done the same thing at Kentucky, Texas
A&M, and Alabama." The tactic was viewed as a winning strategy
and it spread throughout the South." According to one account, Coach
Bradshaw would fail to inform his players they were entitled to their
scholarship, and then he would have them sign a waiver releasing the
school from its obligation." Despite Earl Sneed's assurances and the
fact that for all practical purposes coaches like Bradshaw were creating
their own one-year scholarship, the proposal at the 1965 convention
failed.94

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

supra note 11, at 133.
Id.
Id at 134.
Id.
Id.
See Morton Sharnik & Robert Creamer, The New Rage To Win, SPORTs
ORIARD,

ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 8, 1962, at 14.

90. Id
91.
Id. at 17. Paul "Bear" Bryant was one of the most successful college football
coaches in the history of the sport. During his twenty-five-year reign at Alabama, he won six
national championships and thirteen conference titles. He was the national coach of the year
three times and Southeastern Conference (SEC) coach of the year eight times. He finished
his career as the Alabama football coach, but he also coached at Maryland, Kentucky, and
Texas A&M before arriving in Tuscaloosa. At the time of his retirement, his 323 wins were
the most of all time. See Bear Bryant WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bear._Bryant
(last visited Feb. 23, 2012); PAUL W BRYANT MUSEUM, http://bryantmuseum.com (last visited

Feb. 23, 2012).
92. See Sharnik & Creamer,supra note 89, at 14.
93. Id at 17, 63.
94.
See ORIARD, supla note 11, at 135-36. The proposal to amend required a twothirds vote but received only a 131 to 112 majority.
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But the four-year deal continued to frustrate coaches who found it
hard to compete with "deadwood" and scholarships taken by players
who quit. 95 The NCAA maintained its stance that a scholarship was for
a "scholar," a student first, and not for athletic performance. Moving
to a one-year scholarship would threaten this balance and open the
doors to more litigation." Nonetheless, David Swank, the new
University of Oklahoma representative, made the same proposal in
1967, which passed by a larger majority but failed to receive the
required two-thirds.97
However, the 1967 convention was noteworthy for other reasons.
New interpretations of the rules allowed for the reduction or
cancellation of scholarships for nonparticipation and "serious
misconduct."' Schools could now use more subtle means to "run kids
off" without having to resort to the ham-handed approach of
Bradshaw and Bryant. Control was slipping away from athletes into
the firm grasp of coaches and athletic departments.
Prior to the 1967 convention, the scholarship amendment
proposals were about competition, removing "deadwood" and not
allowing student-athletes a free ride." When Swank proposed a new
interpretation of "serious misconduct" at the 1969 convention, a new
rationale drove the request.o The 1968 Mexico City games offer the
iconic visual of the bowed heads and raised fists of Tommie Smith and
John Carlos. "' In the same year, Muhammad Ali defied the
government and avoided the draft.02 In July of 1968, a powerful article
published in Sports Ilustrated, "The Black Athlete-A Shameful
Story," chronicled the black athlete's unrest.'o3 College athletics and
campuses were by no means immune to the upheaval. From Berkeley
95. See id. The term "deadwood" refers to a player who is undesirable to the
coaching staff but retains a scholarship. Such a player takes up a scholarship that counts
against a team's total but is no longer useful to the coach.
96. See id. at 134.
97. See id. The vote was tallied at 136.
98.

SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 12, at 83. Serious misconduct had previously

been defined by the university's conduct code as applied to all other students. Now, with the
rule change, the athletic department could create its own set of standards. For example, an
athlete could be guilty of serious misconduct, and thus a scholarship could be cancelled if he
or she did not follow the direction of a coach.
99. See ORIARD, supm note 11, at 135.
100. Id at 136.
101. DAVID K. WIGGINS, GLORY BOUND: BLACK ATHLETES INA WHITE AMERICA 110
(1997).
102. Id at 106.
103. Jack Olsen, The Black Athlete-A Shameful Story, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 1,
1968, at 15.
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to Princeton, black athletes were changing sports programs.'" In 1968,
some thirty-seven racially tinged events occurred across the country on
predominantly white campuses." More came in 1969 and on larger
campuses." Oregon State, Wyoming, Indiana, Washington, and Iowa
all made national news with their conflicts in the months following
Swank's proposal.'7 Athletes were more willing to challenge coaches
and "across the country made life miserable for administrators and
support personnel."'
In February of 1969, Dee Andros, a highly respected coach at
Oregon State University (OSU), told junior linebacker Fred Milton
that his beard was against team rules and must be shaved.'" Andros
said that in over twenty years not a single player had defied him, but
Fred Milton refused to shave and was kicked off the team."o The
Black Student Union (BSU) took the matter to the administration."'
The school's president declined to intervene but asked a school
committee to investigate." 2 Angered that the president would not take
a stand, the BSU asked that all black students withdraw from school."'3
Classes were boycotted and the faculty and community divided."4
By the time the committee ruled that some mustaches would be
allowed and that facial hair should only be regulated during the season,
more than two-thirds of the school's African-American population had
left OSU."' During the basketball season, three OSU players sat out
the final games in protest."' Four black players from the University of
Oregon refused to play the game against OSU. "' Washington,
Washington State, and Oregon refused to play against the OSU
Beavers."'
104. SeewiGGiNs, supmnote 101, at 110.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. ORIARD, supanote 11, at 137.
108. WIGGINs, supm note 101, at 110.
109. John Underwood, Shave Off That Thing!, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 1, 1969, at
21,22.
110. Id.
111. See ORIARD, supra note 11, at 94. Oregon State's president had the Committee on
Minority Affairs investigate the issue.
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Id at 93, 97-102 (describing the divided response of the area newspapers and
community members).
115. Id.at 94.
116. Id at 96.
117. John Underwood, The Desperate Coach,SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 25, 1969, at
66.
118. Id
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Disturbances continued throughout the summer, dividing
campuses and communities. At the University of Wyoming, the Black
Student Alliance announced a demonstration against Brigham Young
University."' Coach Lloyd Eaton told one of his captains, Joe
Williams, a black player, that anyone who wore an armband for the
game would be kicked off the squad.'20 The next day, when fourteen
Wyoming players walked into coach Lloyd Eaton's office and asked to
wear armbands, Eaton refused to let them speak and dismissed them
from the team.12' He spewed racial epithets while the group was
walking out the door.'22 Neither side backed down and the community
outside of the football team was divided. The president and alumni
aligned themselves with Eaton, while the student and faculty senate
aligned with the players.' Seven of the faculty members threatened to
resign if the players were not reinstated.'24 The local media was solidly
in the coach's corner, but when the student newspaper's editor spoke
out against Eaton, he resigned, citing the wishes of the student body."'
Confrontations continued throughout the year. At Indiana,
fourteen black players boycotted practice.'26 Black faculty and staff
called for an investigation of football coach John Pont's actions, and
black members of the marching band and cheerleading squad
boycotted the game against Iowa.'27 The booster club gave Pont a
standing ovation and local papers were divided on the appropriate
response.28

Jim Owens of Washington suspended four players for
unsatisfactory answers to questions he asked about commitment to the
football program. 129 Protests were ignited in Seattle, and the
administration forced Owens to reconsider his decision.',o Owens
reinstated three of the players.'

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

ORIARD, supm note 11, at 104.
Id
Id
Id at 105.
Id at 106.
Id
Id at 107-08.
Id at 111.
Id
Id at 111-12.
Id at 104.
Id at 114.
Id
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Racially tinged conflicts emerged at Iowa, Maryland, and San
Francisco State. 32 Disturbances arose at Michigan State University,
the University of Oklahoma, the University of Texas at El Paso, and
the University of Kansas, among others.'33
Coaches and administrators quit at an alarming rate, and at the
time Sports Illustrated's "The Desperate Coach" was written, there
were seventy vacant university presidencies.'34 The article quoted
Steve Belko of Oregon: "This is the worst thing that has ever
happened.... We are facing the greatest crisis in sports history [and]
3
S
[n]obody seems to realize how critical this situation is.""1
With this climate to consider, David Swank proposed the new
interpretation of "serious misconduct" at the 1969 NCAA convention.
Approval would grant athletic departments the power to create their
own rules and dismiss whomever they pleased for whatever reason
they pleased. Immediately questions were posed about the impact this
interpretation would have on black athletes.'36 Swank responded that
the faculty committees would protect the black athletes from any
improper treatment.'37 Fear of abuse was a concern, but the fear of the
loss of control over athletes was greater, and the latter won the day."'
The measure passed.'39 What was the result? "[W]e don't have to put
up with troublemakers anymore," said Ray Graves, the head football
coach at Florida.'40
Graves's assessment was correct. The standard was no longer the
university's definition of serious misconduct that applied to all
students, but now included disobedience of "established athletic

132. Underwood, supo note 117, at 68.
133. WIGGINS, supo note 101, at 110.
134. Underwood, supra note 117, at 68.
135. Id. at 70.
136. NCAA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 63RD ANNUAL CONVENTION 99-105 (1969).
Extensive discussion was conducted on the floor on the proposed new interpretation. C.D.
Henry, from Grambling College, a historically black institution, was the first to follow David
Swank. He spoke eloquently on the difficulties he and those he knew faced during his
collegiate career. Acknowledging the times were different, he contended African-American
athletes were still living in a predominantly white world and faced special challenges. He
was concerned that black athletes would be too easily excluded. Swank countered that the
NCAA council would be the safety net for abuses. Tuskegee Institute's representative also
questioned the policy, and the debate continued with nine additional speakers. In the end,
Swank's proposal passed 181 to 86,
137. SeeORIARD, supranote 11, at 137.
138. Id.
139. Id Swank's proposal passed 167 to 79.
140. John Underwood, Concessions-AndLies, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 8, 1969,
at 29, 31.
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department policies and rules." 4 ' At their own discretion, coaches and
athletic departments could strip a player of his scholarship.' "Serious
misconduct" was whatever the coach wanted it to be. The pendulum
of control swung further in the direction of coaches and athletic
departments. They no longer had to worry about protest or racial
discontent; they had "almost total control over athletes' behavior both
on and off the court and playing field."l 43
The NCAA's commitment to amateurism and the four-year deal
had given the student-athlete a modicum of control. He was free to
sign on and then walk away. He was free to defy the coach. He was
able to grow a beard, oppose racism by protest, and wear a wristband
in solidarity with teammates. In January of 1973, institutions and
coaches asserted their authority by doing away with the four-year
deal.'" On that Saturday morning in Chicago, a show of hands
approved proposal number thirty-nine and the four-year scholarship
was reduced to one.145 Control in college sports shifted dramatically to
athletic departments and coaches, and away from athletes, who were
now clearly being paid to play, with their performance reviewed
annually by their bosses.
The current NCAA rule mandates that athletic scholarships be
awarded for no more than one academic year.14'6 The scholarship
covers the cost of tuition, fees, room, board, and books. 147 The
National Letter of Intent commits the athlete to a full four years and
makes it difficult to transfer.14'8 The school, however, may revoke the
141. Id.(quoting NCAA CONST. of 1969, art. III,
142, SACK& STAUROWSKY, supranote 12, at 83.
143. SACK, supra note 27, at 71.
144. See ORIARD, supm note 11, at 139-40.
145.

§ 1 official interpretation 2).

See 67TH ANNUAL CONVENTION, supra note 4, at 123. The proceeding itself was

only noteworthy because of its length. The change was monumental, doing away with fouryear scholarships, and yet only two men spoke (compared to the twelve who spoke during
1969 proceedings to change the interpretation of "serious misconduct"), and only eleven lines
are taken in the convention proceedings book. Quietly, the change had been made.
146. NCAA, 2010-11NCAA DvisoNIMANuAL, art. 15.3.3, at 203 (2010), available
at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4180-2010-201 1-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx [hereinafter
NCAA Div. I MANUAL]. Although four exceptions exist to the rule that the scholarship be no
less than a year, interestingly there are no exceptions to the rule that it shall not be for more
than a year.
147. See id. art. 15.2.1-3, at 196-98 (explaining each component of the three financial
aid prongs: tuition and fees, room and board, and books).
148. See id. art. 14.5, at 175-84. The so-called antitransfer rules pose formidable
obstacles for student-athletes who seek to transfer. Being forced to ask first for a release risks
losing eligibility; the rules contain numerous traps for the unwary. It is not entirely clear that
these rules are legally defensible, but a full-blown discussion of their legality is best left to
another day.
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scholarship immediately and at any time for fraudulent misrepresentation, serious misconduct, voluntary withdrawal from a sport for
personal reasons, or if the athlete is rendered ineligible for
competition.'4 9 There are some protections against a revocation before
the one-year renewable has expired, but once the full academic year is
completed, the school has the power to retain or discard athletes as it
pleases.' An athlete who is injured or falls ill, one who does not play
well enough or is replaced by a superior recruit, or one who simply
does not fit the school's model because of a coaching change or a "bad
attitude" may be released from the team and stripped of a scholarship
without further justification. ' The transition to the one-year
renewable was in a sense a cost-cutting measure by the NCAA. No
longer would a school be forced to waste a scholarship on a player it
did not want around. The school's only obligation to an athlete who
gives his or her blood, sweat, and tears is to notify promptly the athlete
of the nonrenewal decision and of the athlete's right to appeal.'52
The scholarship was instituted in 1956 to shield the NCAA from
potential litigation and claims of professionalism. The NCAA wedded
its scholarship system to an amateurism ideal. But the amateurism
model gave the athletes immense freedom to act as they desired, and in
some cases, not act at all. The NCAA's response-as we have seenwas a quiet morphing from the four-year "full-ride" to the one-year
renewable. Although the one-year deal has also been cloaked in the
garb of amateurism, the stage is set for an antitrust attack based upon
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
III. BOOMER'S CASE
A.

AllAboutBoomer

The plaintiff Boomer Suner enrolled at the University of
Oklahoma (OU) on an athletic scholarship two years ago."' Prior to
149. See id. art. 15.3.4.2, at 204 (explaining the reduction or cancellation policy).
150. See id. art. 15.3.5, at 205 (explaining scholarship renewal process). The NCAA
does prohibit a school from reducing or cancelling a scholarship during the period of the
award (the academic school year) on the basis of athletic ability, illness, injury, a mental
condition, or any other athletics reason. Id.art. 15.3.4.3, at 204.
151. SeeOIARD, supmnote 11, at 141.
152. NCAA Div. I MANUAL, supo3 note 146, art. 15.3.5.1, at 205. The NCAA requires
that the institution decide on renewals by July 1 for the following semester and notify
promptly in writing each athlete affected.
153. The Boomer Suner character is loosely based on the real Joe Agnew, whose
lawsuit provided the impetus for this Essay. See Complaint, supra note 3. Though the case
was filed in the Northern District of California, the NCAA succeeded in getting the case
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enrolling at OU, Boomer was a highly sought-after high school
quarterback at Booker T. Washington High School in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
having garnered all-state honors and being named Oklahoma State
Player of the Year by both major newspapers in the state. As a fouryear starter at Booker T. Washington, he led his team to state
championships in both his junior and senior years. Boomer's stellar
academic record made him a particularly attractive recruit. He had
grades and standardized test scores that placed him in the upper
echelon of college applicants generally. Boomer received scholarship
offers from Stanford, Vanderbilt, Baylor, the University of Tulsa, and
OU before settling on OU.
Boomer's freshman year at OU did not go well. While he was
able to earn his way into the starting lineup midway through the
season, he suffered a severe concussion in only his second game.
Upon the advice of his personal physician, he did not play the rest of
the year, although OU's team physician cleared him to play a week
before OU's bowl game in early January. OU renewed his scholarship
for his sophomore year, but again, acting on the advice of his
physician, Boomer decided that his football playing days were over. At
the conclusion of Boomer's sophomore year, OU informed him that
his scholarship would not be renewed. Boomer exhausted OU's
internal appeal process, and the decision not to renew his scholarship
was affirmed. He now brings this section 1 antitrust lawsuit.
B.

The ThresholdIssue: Is the NCAA Vulnerable to T2us Section 1
Attack?

The gist of Boomer's antitrust claim is that the market in which
he sought to participate was unreasonably restrained by the "one-yearonly" mandate. Boomer alleges that in an openly competitive market,
he would have been able to negotiate for and receive a significantly
transferred to its home territory in the Southern District of Indiana. In an order filed
September 1, 2011, Judge Jane Magnus Stinson granted the NCAA's motion to dismiss.
Agnewv. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 WL 3878200 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1,2011).
The dismissal order rested heavily on Banks v NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992), a much
criticized 1992 opinion in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
granted the NCAA's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, which challenged the NCAA
rules that denied eligibility to a college athlete who agreed to be represented by an agent or
who entered the draft-the so called "no agent," "no draft" rules. In Banks, Circuit Judge
Flaum penned an eloquent dissent much more in tune with the modern world of big-time
intercollegiate sports. Id. at 1094-1100 (Flaum, J., dissenting). In a telephone conversation
on September 3, 2011, Agnew's attorney, Stewart Paynter, a noted antitrust litigator, indicated
that Judge Stinson's dismissed order would be appealed. Telephone Interview with Stewart
Paynter, Attorney for Joseph Agnew (Sept. 3, 2011).
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better deal than the one-year renewable. Given his position in the
marketplace, Boomer contends that in an unconstrained market he
would have been in a position to secure a two-, three-, four-, or perhaps
even a five-year deal with injury protection. The fact that he did not
receive a multiyear athletic scholarship is directly attributable to the
NCAA rule prohibiting its member schools from offering any deal
more favorable to market participants like Boomer.
In a section 1 case, the threshold issue is whether the defendant
has entered into a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade.""'4 This is the so-called "duality" requirement imposed upon
plaintiffs in section 1 cases. From the defense perspective, a defendant
that is a "single entity" is off the hook-a single business entity acting
on its own is invulnerable to section 1 attack because it has not entered
into a contract, combination, or conspiracy with anyone.
So the question is whether the NCAA rule mandating one-year
deals only is "concerted action" or the act of a "single entity."
According to the United States Supreme Court's most recent guidance
on this issue in a sports context, the meaning of "contract, combination
... or conspiracy" in section 1 of the Sherman Act turns on the "'basic
distinction' in the Sherman Act 'between concerted and independent
action."' ' Concerted action threatens free markets because it
'deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of
decisionmaking.""'" In American Needle, Inc. v NFL, the Supreme
Court held that the NFL's conduct relating to the licensing of
intellectual property (licensing for hats, of all things) constituted
concerted action.' In other words, the NFL was treated as thirty-two
separate business entities for section 1 purposes insofar as their
marketing of intellectual property rights was concerned.
Interestingly, the NCAA filed an amicus brief in American
Needle, siding with the NFL on the single-entity defense theory. It
should have known better. In its own landmark antitrust case, NCAA
v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (the so-called
television rights case), the NCAA learned that it is vulnerable to a
section 1 attack.'" And modern case law in the interim has supported
the view that, at least insofar as the threshold determination is
154. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1(2006).
155. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)).
156. Id. at 2211 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 769 (1984)).
157. Id. at 2215.
158. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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concerned, the NCAA will not prevail on the single-entity defense.'"
Quite simply, there is little disputing the fact that for section 1
purposes, NCAA rules reflect the concerted actions of its member
schools, which effectively include over 1000 colleges and universities
that play intercollegiate sports.
Each member school is an
"independent center of decisionmaking." The NCAA mandate that
athletic scholarships must all come in the form of a one-year
renewable constitutes the concerted action of its scholarship-granting
members.
Now this is not to say that Boomer's case is by any means over. It
is just that he is very highly likely to get past the threshold of showing
a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy." The next order of
business is to show that Boomer has standing as an antitrust plaintiff in
a section 1 suit.
C

Boomer Standingas a Plaintiff

The oft-repeated nostrum is that to state a claim under the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show injury to "competition." 60 The
Act, crafted for the business world, requires that plaintiffs demonstrate
commercial injury to themselves along with injury to consumers in the
marketplace. 6' According to the 1955 Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws: "The
general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in
open markets. This policy is a primary feature of private enterprise.
Most Americans have long recognized that [the] opportunity for ...
market rivalry [is a] basic tenet[] of our faith in competition as a form
of economic organization." 62 The Sherman Act is the Magna Carta of
free enterprise."' Is Boomer the type of plaintiff the Sherman Act is
designed to protect? Has he shown that he has suffered harm in the
marketplace along with other consumers?
The relevant marketplace to consider here is the market for the
opportunity to pursue a bachelor's degree while playing an
intercollegiate sport. Boomer has suffered economic harm as a direct
159. See Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 963 (6th
Cir. 2004); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998); White v. NCAA, No. 2:06cv-00999-VBF-MAN, slip op. at 2-4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2006); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On
Football Players Litig., 398 F Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (WD. Wash. 2005).
160. E&L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 E3d 23,28 (2d Cir. 2006).
161. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
162. ArroRNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L CoMm. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (1955)
(footnote omitted).
163. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 291 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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result of his inability to bargain about the overall cost of his attendance
with the degree-granting institution that recruited him.'" In order to
make the call on whether a given restraint is unlawful, courts generally
ask the plaintiff to define a "relevant market"; this market
determination necessitates an inquiry into both the "product market"
"Product" in the term "product
and the "geographic market."'
market" is not some magic antitrust incantation-it is simply a way of
saying that if a service or thing is exchanged in "transactions that are
commercial in nature," a relevant market is shown.'" The opportunity
to pursue a bachelor's degree while participating in an intercollegiate
sport is the product or service here. The sale of this product or service
brings the transaction within the ambit of the antitrust laws. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in UnitedStates v
Brown Universityobserved: "The exchange of money for services ...
is a quintessential commercial transaction.... Therefore, the payment
of tuition in return for educational services constitutes commerce."',67
In Boomer's case, and for other student-athletes similarly situated, the
NCAA and its member schools are restraining competition in
connection with this transaction. The opportunity to pursue a
bachelor's degree while playing an intercollegiate sport is a distinct
product. The geographic market is the United States. While there is
indeed an educational component to all this, it is still "commerce"
within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
If not for the rule barring multiyear athletic scholarships, coming
out of high school, Boomer surely was in a position to negotiate for
and secure a tuition discount better than the one he received. It is clear
that Boomer was situated to get a multiyear discount, given how
heavily he was recruited. In antitrust parlance, the NCAA and its
members conspired to maintain the price of the opportunity they were
providing for high-achieving athletic applicants by agreeing never to
offer multiyear athletic scholarships. In an unconstrained market,
member schools would compete with one another by offering athletic
scholarships of different (and often longer) duration. As a result of this
"contract, combination ...

or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,"' 68

student-athletes overpay for the opportunity, while the member schools
are unjustly enriched. After all, athletic scholarships bring substantial
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

United States v. Brown Univ., 5 E3d 658, 671-78 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id at 665.
Id.at 666.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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collateral benefits to member schools through the enhanced publicity,
ticket sales, licensing revenue, increased donations, and television
dollars."' It is not for nothing that schools conduct recruiting wars.
The NCAA and its member schools are engaged in a highly
commercialized venture when they sponsor intercollegiate sports. The
NCAA and its member schools restrain the market by fixing its costs
on the backs of a substantial group of consumers: student-athletes.
Still, this does not yet mean that Boomer will succeed in his
section 1 claim. But it is clear that he has standing and that the NCAA
is at least vulnerable to a section 1 attack. But what about the
substance of the actual restraint; can it withstand antitrust scrutiny
under section 1?
D

Is theAllegedRestaintIllegal UnderSection 1?

1.

Is It a Per Se Violation?

Case law interpreting section 1 makes it abundantly clear that
price fixing is both abhorrent and liberally defined. In UnitedStates v
Trenton PotteriesCo., Justice Stone stated:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is
the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices,
whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the
market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable
price fixed today may through economic and business changes become
the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be
maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured
by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves
169. The television deal in 2011 between the Pacific 12 Conference, ESPN, and Fox is
a good example of the enhanced publicity and dollars brought in by athletic scholarships. In
the spring of 2011, Fox and ESPN contracted to a twelve-year, nearly $3 billion television
deal with the Pacific 12 Conference. The networks will annually televise forty-four football
games and sixty-eight basketball games nationally. The revenue will be shared equally by the
twelve schools who will receive $21 million each year. See Diane Pucin, Pac-12 To Feaston
New TVDeal,LATIMEs (May 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011 /may/04/sports/la-sppac-10-fox-espn-20110504.
In terms of revenue based on the individual sports, there are twenty-eight schools that
exceed $10 million in basketball-related revenue. See Patrick Rishe, Duke, Louisville, North
Carolina Generatethe Most College BasketballRevenue, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2011, 10:59 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/03/07/duke-louisville-north-carolina-generate-themost-college-basketball-revenue/. There are forty-five college football programs that exceed
$50 million in revenue. See Josh Robbins, How Much Revenue Did Your Favorite Football
Bowl Subdivision School Take in in 2007-08? This Chart Will Tell You, ORLANDOSENTINEL
(July 28, 2009, 11:50 AM), http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/sports-college/2009/07/howmuch-revenue-did-your-favorite-fbs-school-take-in-in-200708-this-chart-will-tell-you.html.
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unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute
inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed
and without ... the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it

has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic
conditions.o70
And in UnitedStates v Socony- Vacuwn Oil Co., Justice Douglas cited
TrentonPottenesand went further:
But the thrust of the rule is deeper and reaches more than monopoly
power. Any combination which tampers with price structures is
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the pricefixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that
they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly
interfering with the free play of market forces. The Act places all such
schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our economy
against any degree of interference.'
Abundant case law supports the view that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate . .. commerce is illegal perse."2
The policy justification for this harsh treatment of any kind of
price-fixing scheme was described in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v
UnitedStates:
However, there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use. This principle of perseunreasonableness
not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it
also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved,
as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a
particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly
fruitless when undertaken. 73
So, the rule of per se illegality furthers basic antitrust goals by
promoting business certainty in the interest of judicial economy.

170.
171.
172.
173.

273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221 (1940).
Id. at 223.
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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The question, then, in Boomer's case is whether the NCAA's ban
on multiyear athletic scholarships fits with the broad definition of
price-fixing, worthy of condemnation as a per se violation. If the
product market is the opportunity to pursue a bachelor's degree while
playing an intercollegiate sport, can it not be said that the conspiracy
"tampers" with the price structure? The fact that this tampering does
not affect all consumers (just the recruited athletes) would not get the
NCAA conspirators off the hook. In price-fixing cases, it is clear from
the previously cited cases that the plaintiff need not show harm to all
the participants in the market to make a case. Courts routinely find
that harm to competition can be demonstrated without showing harm
to each and every consumer in the marketplace. 74 Boomer is a
consumer and there are many others like him. As a result of the
conspiracy manifested by the NCAA rule against multiyear
scholarships, student-athletes pay more for the opportunity than they
would pay in an unrestrained market. A reasonably good case can be
made that the NCAA is guilty of a classic per se violation.
The odds are, however, that even though the case for per se
violation is solid, the courts will evaluate the NCAA mandate under
the rule of reason. Both the sports cases and the pervasive trend in
antitrust jurisprudence support this conclusion. In Board ofRegents,
the Supreme Court elucidated the rationale for the rule-of-reason
treatment in sports cases even in a situation where price fixing was
implicated (the NCAA had through its elaborate television plan both
fixed prices and limited output).'" Although the Court ultimately
condemned the plan, it did acknowledge that the proper mode of
analysis was the rule of reason and not a per se approach:
Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily
condemned as a matter of law under an "illegal per se" approach
because the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so
high; a per se rule is applied when "the practice facially appears to be
one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output." In such circumstances a restraint is presumed
unreasonable without inquiry into the particular market context in
which it is found. Nevertheless, we have decided that it would be
inappropriate to apply a perse rule to this case.
174. See id.; Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 221; Trenton Potteies,273 U.S. at 39798.
175. 468 U.S.85, 100 (1984).
176. Id (citation omitted) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
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The Court went on to explain that one reason for not applying a per se
rule is that the Court lacks judicial experience with the particular type
of arrangement.'" But the overriding reason for not applying the per
se rule to sports law cases is that the sports business is a unique
business enterprise: "[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if
the product is to be available at all.""' The Court waxed eloquently
about the nature of the sports business, and of amateur sports in
particular:
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is
competition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of
course, this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on
which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be
marketed. A myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the
field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical
violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon,
and all restrain the manner in which institutions compete.... And the
integrity of the "product" cannot be preserved except by mutual
agreement .... 1
The Court's conclusion was that NCAA-imposed restraints are better
suited to a rule-of-reason analysis. So the final question in Boomer's
case, then, is whether the NCAA rule prohibiting multiyear athletic
scholarships is a reasonable restraint under the rule of reason. Under
the analysis, the critical criterion to be used in assessing the legality of
a restraint is its impact on competition.'
2.

Does the Restraint Pass Muster Under the Rule of Reason?

The classic formulation of the rule-of-reason analysis harkens
back to Justice Brandeis's opinion in Board of Trade of Chicago v
UnitedStates:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id
Idat l0l.
Id.at 101-02.
Id.at 103.
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imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences. 181
The modem articulation of the rule-of-reason analysis, jettisoning
much of the elegance of the Brandeis formulation, adopts a nuanced
balancing test that weighs the anticompetitive effects of the restraint
against its procompetitive justifications.182 The purpose of the analysis
is to facilitate a court's ability to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint.' This is all because the
Sherman Act reflects a strong national policy that business
competition is desirable as "[t]he heart of our national economic policy
long has been faith in the value of competition."" Unnecessary harm
to free and robust business competition is the harm to be avoided.
So how does the one-year-only restraint fare under the rule-ofreason analysis?
There can be no doubt that the challenged restriction limits the
ability of NCAA member schools to negotiate and enter into
scholarship arrangements of their own choosing. In fact, had the
restraint not arisen in a sports context, it likely would be condemned as
a matter of law under an "illegal per se" approach. The anticompetitive consequences of this regulation are obvious and apparent.
Student-athletes and schools are entirely prevented from entering into
pricing agreements which both parties might prefer. This interference
with the setting of price by free market forces is strongly disfavored by
well-established antitrust doctrine.' It is not in the least chimerical to
suggest that a significant number of member schools would choose to
alter the price of the opportunity being sold by offering multiyear
scholarships in order to compete more effectively for talented players
against schools that choose to offer only one-year deals. And the
ability of a student-athlete to negotiate for more than a one-year deal is
entirely thwarted by the one-year-only mandate. As a factual matter,
the NCAA's market power is evident. Their member schools are
181. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
182. Bd ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 103.
183. Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
184. Standard Oil Co. v FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
185. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 338 (1969); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 159 (1940).
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clearly engaged in "transactions that are commercial in nature" when it
comes to offering for sale the opportunity for a student-athlete to
pursue a bachelor's degree while playing a sport intercollegiately."'
What are the NCAA's procompetitive justifications for the oneyear-only mandate? Under this prong of the rule-of-reason analysis,
the NCAA must demonstrate that its prohibition on multiyear athletic
scholarships has procompetitive effects that outweigh the
anticompetitive ones.
Given the history of the NCAA as an antitrust defendant, the
organization will likely attempt to justify the restraint by arguing that
the one-year-only mandate preserves amateurism and helps to
maintain competitive balance. These two justifications have been
offered up in just about every antitrust case in which the NCAA has
been a defendant.'" However, it does appear that the NCAA has
learned that any justification based on cost reduction is not a valid
procompetitive justification in a section 1 case.'"
Can it be fairly argued that the one-year-only rule helps to
maintain amateurism? As noted earlier, the NCAA had for many years
maintained its amateur system under a regime where four-year
scholarships were the norm. In fact, it might be observed that the
previous regime represented something of a "heyday" for amateurism.
The lifting of the limitation would appear to have no effect whatsoever
on amateurism; student-athletes would continue to receive no wages in
connection with their playing of a sport. Amateurism as we know it is
entirely consistent with athletic scholarships of longer duration. In
fact, the NCAA acknowledges:
The idea of a five-year scholarship reflects the fact that college
scholarships are fundamentally academic, even if the merit basis is
sports skill. Under the current structure of athletics scholarships,
athletes may be legitimately concerned that their continued access to
186. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 E3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993).
187. Bd ofRegents,468 U.S. at 96.
188. In Law v NCAA, the NCAA sought to justify its rule restricting compensation
for certain coaches by arguing that it would reduce costs. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit made it clear that in the context of section 1, the cost reduction was
unavailing:
IC]ost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification. If it were, any
group of competing buyers could agree on maximum prices. Lower prices cannot
justify a cartel's control of prices ....
[C]ost savings have not qualified as a
defense under the antitrust laws....
We are dubious that the goal of cost reductions can serve as a legally
sufficient justification....
134 E3d 1010, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 1998).
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education depends on sports success. This can create a conflict of
incentives that may lead to an emphasis on athletics at the cost of
academics.'
Rather than protecting and fostering amateurism, the NCAA's oneyear-only mandate serves to reduce costs and to provide an increased
level of control that coaches and athletic departments have over
athletes. To say that the mandate fosters and protects amateurism is a
conjured-up rationale with no basis in fact. As the Court observed in
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On FootballPlayersLitigation,"[T]he NCAA's
attempt to frame this case as challenging ... amateurism ... is a mischaracterization of the issues raised. . . .""o
Can it be fairly argued that the one-year-only mandate helps to
promote competitive balance? As Justice Brandeis so presciently
observed:
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable.'9 ' The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.' 92
Once again, it should be noted that prior to 1973, multiyear athletic
scholarships were the norm. Moreover, the impetus for the change to
the one-year-only scholarship had nothing to do with competitive
balance. While more empirical data would certainly be helpful,
knowing what we know now, it is hard to say that the overall
competitive balance in intercollegiate sports has been well served by
the ban on multiyear athletic scholarships. Rather, it seems that a
reasonably good case can be made that the world of intercollegiate
sports had better competitive balance in the years preceding the ban.
And common sense suggests that many schools are severely
disadvantaged in the recruiting wars by the ban on multiyear
discounts.' Four-year deals would also be much more likely to lead to
increased graduation rates.1
189. Complaint, supranote 3, at 8.
190. 398 F Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (WD. Wash. 2005).
191. As discussed earlier in this Essay, the change to one-year-only scholarships was
driven by a variety of factors (like controlling costs and controlling the behavior of athletes),
but maintaining competitive balance was not among the factors considered.
192. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
193. In Boomer's case for example, the University of Tulsa might have been able to
offer a four-year deal to Boomer to compete against OU's one-year deal. Because of the
depth ofOU's recruiting pool, OU might view it as in its best interest to stick firmly to a one-
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In sum, rule-of-reason analysis suggests rather persuasively that
the one-year-only mandate violates section 1 of the Sherman Act,
particularly in light of the obvious less-restrictive alternative: to allow
each of the member schools to decide for itself whether to offer one-,
two-, three-, four-, or even five-year deals.'
IV. CONCLUSION

As long as the NCAA continues to play the preeminent role in
the administration of our nation's intercollegiate sports programs, its
rules are likely to continue to face scrutiny under antitrust laws. And
as the court in Board ofRegents observed, "There can be no question
but that it needs ample latitude to play that role ... ."'" Moreover,
while there is no doubt abundant criticism of our tradition of
amateurism in college sports, it seems unlikely that litigation will be
the vehicle for dismantling the entire system. In fact, courts generally
adhere to the view expressed by Justice Stevens that "the preservation
of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the
Sherman Act."'" But Justice Stevens went on to say that it was
impossible under the Sherman Act for the NCAA to "blunt[] the
ability of member institutions" to participate in unfettered markets as
required by the Sherman Act.'" And the same conclusion that was
drawn in that case can be drawn here: The NCAA's one-year-only
mandate, like the price-fixing scheme in BoardofRegents, "restricted

year deal. The point is that a more openly competitive marketplace is viewed as the most
likely environment to nurture competitive balance. As previously noted, "The heart of our
national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition." Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
194. Fewer athletes will be run off and displaced, thus more of them will stay in school
even if they are no longer playing a sport. Again, more empirical data is needed to support
this idea, but common sense suggests that it is true. In White v NCAA, the court found that
the plaintiff's allegations suggested that student-athletes were forced to pay "higher prices
than would result from unfettered competition." No. 2:06-cv-00999-VBF-MAN, slip op. at
*4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006). If this is in fact true, basic rules of economics suggest
extorting higher prices for the opportunity to pursue a bachelor's degree while playing an
intercollegiate sport would reduce the raw number of student-athletes who follow the pursuit
through to the end-the receipt of a bachelor's degree.
195. Allowing schools to make their own decisions also appears consistent with the
NCAA's articulated commitment to institutional autonomy-a theme repeatedly referenced in
NCAA governance.
196. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
197. Id
19 8. Id.
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rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the
Nation's life."'"

199. Id.

